This paper demonstrates that the Modigliani Miller Theorem on capital structure does in general not apply to banks when faced with endogenous liquidity risk in form of bank runs and asset illiquidity. The Modigliani Miller Theorem states that under certain assumptions, rms with dierent capital structure must have same values if they have identical return distributions (risk class). This paper shows, under endogenous liquidity risk the bank's risk class changes in debt ratio and coupons demanded by depositors such that the Modigliani Miller Theorem can in general not apply when repricing of risk in form of higher coupons is taken into account. In equilibrium, bank value is non-monotone in capital structure. In particular, only the all equity nanced bank achieves the highest risk class.
Motivation
We demonstrate that the Modigliani Miller Theorem Miller, 1958, 1963 ) does in general not apply to banks which invest in illiquid assets and face endogenous liquidity risk in form of bank runs. Our results hold with or without deposit insurance. The Modigliani Miller Theorem states that in a suciently frictionless market 1 the capital structure of a rm (here bank) does not aect the rm's value. The theorem plays a prominent role today in the debate on bank capital regulation (Hellwig, 2010; Hanson et al., 2011; Admati et al., 2013; Myerson, 2014) , (Stiglitz, 1969; Merton, 1977; Hellwig, 1981) these papers assume liquidation at fair value (no bankruptcy cost). As Baxter (1967) however already points out, when taking into account bankruptcy costs the value of the rm becomes dependent on capital structure since leverage alters the rm's return distribution, see also Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott Jr (1976) , Kim (1978) and Myers (1984) .
This paper returns to Baxter's argument and considers bank values when asset liquidation is endogenous and costly. As main contribution of the paper, we characterize bank risk classes and show that capital structure alters risk classes by changing endogenous liquidity risk of the bank. More debt makes the bank more prone to runs which shifts her bankruptcy state. Going one step further, by drawing on the literature on endogenous liquidity risk, we show that bank risk classes also depend on coupons paid to depositors. Interest rate payments are thus more than just transfers since they change the bankruptcy state by altering incentives to roll over debt. The underlying market structure determines the equilibrium change of coupons demanded by depositors and thus the shift in bank's risk class as debt ratio increases since market structure pins down the outside option. In the classic Modigliani Miller setting, by competitiveness of markets, investors may freely trade arbitrary units of debt and equity in banks by borrowing at the risk-free rate and investors' outside option is given by investing in equity and debt of a dierent rm with same return patterns but distinct capital structure. In the classic setting however all debt is risk-free such that investments in debt of dierent rms are perfect substitutes and earn the same rate. In particular, investment in debt yields perfectly correlated returns to investment in storage. Once debt becomes risky and thus pays dierent payos for some states, investor's option to not participate (storage) then constitutes a third investment opportunity which cannot be replicated by investing in equity and debt. To concentrate on demonstrating that bank risk classes may change in debt and coupons when accounting for endogenous liquidity risk, we leave the competitive markets framework and consider a monopolistic bank which maximizes equity value where investors invest in debt but have the outside option of storage. By this assumption, we shut down more complex outside options such as investing in other bank's debt and equity. Under a monopolistic bank, as debt increases we contrast the required rise in coupon to maintain depositors' investment in bank debt to the rise in coupon necessary to keep the bank's risk class constant.
Only if the bank's risk class stays constant the Modigliani Miller Theorem can apply.
Our approach diers from the previous literature on the Modigliani Miller Theorem in that we work in a game theoretic setting, in a monopolistic market, with illiquid assets (costly bankruptcy) and endogenous liquidity risk.
2
In the literature on endogenous liquidity risk in form of debt runs, it is a common result (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Morris and Shin, 2009; Eisenbach, 2017 ) that a bank's short-term debt ratio impacts the critical state (bankruptcy cut-o) below which bank runs enforce asset liquidation while holding the asset's return risk xed.
Empirical evidence conrms that runs are sensitive to leverage (Schroth et al., 2014) .
As debt ratio increases, the critical state goes up, and runs become more likely, by this increasing the riskiness of debt. For this increase in risk, depositors demand a compensation in form of higher coupon payments to continue nancing the bank.
The required increase in coupon to maintain depositors' participation is given by their marginal rate of substitution since the monopolistic bank 3 maximizes equity value and pays coupons to maintain a utility level equal to depositors' outside option storage. Again, by a standard result in the literature on endogenous liquidity risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Morris and Shin, 2009; Eisenbach, 2017) We divide our analysis into three parts. We rst consider run-prone banks which we dene as banks that face a liquidity mismatch on their balance sheet such that debt runs may occur. We show, the critical state below which depositors enforce asset liquidation by running increases in debt ratio, but decreases in the long-run coupon on deposits. As the bank raises her debt ratio, the increased risk of runs leads depositors to demand higher coupons ex ante which in return lowers the risk of runs. In general, depositors' marginal rate of substitution of interest rate for debt ratio is not equal to the 'risk-preserving' change in coupon which we dene as the coupon which would keep the bankruptcy state constant. Thus, under a monopolistic bank in equilibrium, the critical state may change in debt ratio which leads to a shift in the bank's risk class and the Modigliani Miller Theorem does not apply.
Still, we derive a condition under which the value of the bank stays constant in debt despite asset illiquidity, but show that the condition is generically not satised. Otherwise, equilibrium bank value either decreases or increases in short-term debt. Next, we consider run-proof banks which we dene as banks that exhibit no liquidity mismatch. Related Literature The papers contributes to the literature strand on bank runs and endogenous liquidity risk which started with the seminal papers by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980) . Closest to our paper are Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) who analyze optimal risk sharing under partial repayment and Eisenbach (2017) who analyzes eciency of asset liquidation, both under endogenous liquidity risk in a global game. Also closely related are Morris and Shin (2016) , Rochet and Vives (2004) and Allen et al. (2017) 
The Model
There are three dates, t 0 , t 1 and t 2 with no discounting between periods. At time zero, a bank nances a risky asset with equity and short-term debt via demanddeposits. The bank acts in the best interest of and in place of her equity investors, thus the economy has two kinds of agents, the bank and her depositors. The market for deposits and equity are segmented. Equity investors cannot invest in deposits and depositors cannot invest in equity. The idea is that equity investors decide about the measure of deposits the bank accepts to maximize equity value. All agents are risk-neutral. Let 1 − δ ∈ (0, 1) the measure of equity in place at t 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) the measure of short-term debt the bank decides to additionally raise via demanddeposits in order to nance an investment of one unit. To raise deposits in t 0 , the bank oers a demand deposit (debt) contract. For each unit invested in the contract at time zero the bank promises a coupon of one unit if a depositor decides to liquidate the contract prematurely at time one and a long-term coupon k > 1 if a depositor decides to stay invested until time two. Depositors in the economy are symmetric at time zero and each endowed with one unit thus the bank's debt is nanced by a continuum of measure δ of depositors [0, δ] . 5 The bank invests all funds in a risky asset which requires investment of one unit at time zero (investment is scaleable). 5 The assumption that each depositor controls exactly one unit in deposits is important such that depositors are small and symmetric in size.
The asset matures at time t 2 and pays o high return H with probability θ ∼ U [0, 1] and zero with probability 1 − θ, where asset return θ is the state of the economy see below. At the interim period t 1 , the asset generates no cash ow but can be liquidated. Liquidation of the asset yields liquidation value l < 1 per unit invested due to illiquidity.
At time zero, all agents share a common prior about state θ, depositors invest and the state realizes unobservably to all agents. At time one, each depositor i ∈ [0, δ] observes noisy private signals Payos Debt Investors In a run, since depositors withdraw simultaneously 9 , the position in the queue is random. A depositor's probability to be served the original claim of one unit in the queue before the bank runs out of assets is l δn since δn depositors try to withdraw and claim one unit but only l depositors are served. With probability 1 − l δn a queuing depositor is not served and obtains zero. The payo from withdrawing given a run is thus
7 Adding a positive interest rate will not change results. 8 In particular, the intervention by the LOLR avoids the realization of states in which the bank is liquid but insolvent in t 1 since she excessively had to liquidate assets. A treatment of this setting is carried out in Eisenbach (2017). Our assumption mirrors real world central bank interventions, national central banks in Europe may pay Emergency Liquidity Assistance to illiquid but solvent banks. The assumption of intervention of a LOLR is not crucial to our results. 9 For instance electronic withdrawal.
Depositors who roll over in a run get zero. In the absence of a run, coupons are as in the contract if the risky asset pays high at time t 2 . If at t 2 the asset does not pay with likelihood 1 − θ, depositors who roll over get zero.
Event/ Action withdraw roll-over no run,
Debt investor's utility dierence between rolling over debt to period 2 versus withdrawing early in period 1 is given by
Payos Equity investors At time two, the equity investors receive the residual value of investment net of payments to debt investors. Due to limited liability, equity value cannot become negative. If the bank does not voluntarily liquidate assets and continues investment, equity value per unit invested equals
since in case of no run, the bank does not need to liquidate assets. 10 If the bank liquidates the asset voluntarily at t 1 , equity value is
since the bank can reinvest proceeds at t 1 only in storage. We impose existence of states which yield dominant actions (dominance regions)
to obtain an equilibrium selection, see (Morris and Shin, 2001 ). There are states θ and θ such that if θ < θ, withdrawing is a dominant action whereas if θ > θ rolling over is the dominant to debt investors. We refer to [0, θ] as the lower dominance region and call [θ, 1] the upper dominance region. The bound θ depends on the specic contract (1, k) set by the bank and is given as the realization of θ such that
For very high states θ ≥ θ, we impose that the asset earns return H already in period 1 and with certainty. 11 The coordination problem vanishes for state realizations in the upper or lower dominance region. 12 To ensure that debt investors may receive signals from which they can infer that the state has realized in either of the dominance regions, we assume that noise ε is suciently small such that θ(r, k) > 2ε and θ < 1 − 2ε hold.
Equilibrium Coordination Game
Runs by depositors cause asset liquidation and thus interruption of investment.
Liquidation is ex post ecient only if continuation value of investment exceeds liquidation value. Denote by θ e the cut-o state below which liquidation is inecient,
At the interim period, the bank and depositors simultaneously choose actions and decide whether or not to liquidate assets respectively enforce liquidation by withdrawing. The bank is obliged to serve withdrawing depositors either by liquidating assets or by borrowing from LOLR. The bank may voluntarily liquidate additional assets. All proofs can be found in the appendix. The equilibrium concept is Bayes Nash.
Run-prone case
In this section we consider banks which exhibit a liquidity mismatch on their balance sheet and are therefore prone to runs at the interim period. That is, the measure of debt that could be reclaimed at the interim period exceeds the liquidation value of the asset δ ≥ l.
To determine in what states of the world bank assets are liquidated rst observe that a run-prone bank has a dominant action to never voluntarily liquidate assets: Since the bank's actions are not contractible, the bank voluntarily liquidates if and only if equity value from liquidation is higher than value from continuation. If 11 To make this assumption work, the precise return probability of the asset would need to be
with θ ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ (0, 1). The constant 1 θ however does not alter incentives and as θ → 1, all results apply and it is without loss of generality to consider p(θ) = θ, θ ∈ [0, 1].
12 When the asset pays o return H at date one already, the bank can always repay all withdrawing debt investors, H > 1 > δn for all n ∈ [0, 1] and debt ratios δ ∈ (0, 1).
the bank liquidates the asset, equity value from liquidation equals liquidation value of the asset less principal and interest payments to depositors payable at time one and two. But liquidation value of the asset is already lower than the face value of debt since the bank is run-prone. Also the bank has no reinvestment opportunity for the proceeds besides storage, which does not produce additional net interest between time one and two. Thus, if the bank is run-prone, proceeds from liquidation at time one always undercut debt claims at time one and two combined and equity value is zero. A run-prone bank never voluntarily liquidates assets due to a reverse debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977) , all proceeds from liquidation would go to her creditors whereas if she continues she has the chance to earn the high asset return.
Lemma 3.1. The run-prone bank never voluntarily liquidates assets prematurely.
Consequently depositors have to withdraw to enforce liquidation. Note that this result is driven by the lack of protable reinvestment opportunities. We next analyze in which states it is optimal for depositors to withdraw. Debt investors take capital structure of the bank δ and debt contract (1, k) as given.
Proposition 3.1 (Existence and Uniqueness). The game played by depositors has a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is in trigger strategies.
This result is due to Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) . There exists a unique threshold signal (trigger) θ * ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε] such that depositors withdraw if they observe a signal below θ * and roll over if they observe a signal above θ * . In case they observe the trigger directly, a depositor is indierent and we assume that she rolls over. The equilibrium threshold depends on the contract coupon k and capital structure δ. Let n(θ, θ * ) the proportion of depositors who withdraw (aggregate action) in state θ if the trigger is θ * . 13 The equilibrium trigger signal θ * is given as the depositor's private signal which makes her indierent between rolling over her deposit and withdrawing given her belief about the proportion of withdrawing depositors and the payo probability of the asset.
Lemma 3.2. As signals become precise, the equilibrium trigger is given as
The run-prone trigger θ * is monotonically increasing in debt ratio and is monotonically decreasing in coupon. Thus, the threshold at which depositors enforce liquidation depends on the bank's debt ratio and the coupon set by the bank. These monotonicity results have been derived before in dierent settings (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Morris and Shin, 2016; Eisenbach, 2017) . Denote by θ b the critical state below which bank runs occur. For a run-prone bank, the critical state is such that
For all state realizations below θ b the aggregate action exceeds n * = l/δ and a bank run enforces asset liquidation. For state realizations in the interval I = (θ e , θ b ), continuation value of investment is in expectation higher than liquidation value, but depositors enforce liquidation by withdrawing. For state realizations in I the bank therefore loses value because by asset illiquidity bankruptcy is costly. This is in contrast to Stiglitz (1969) and Hellwig (1981) where in case of bankruptcy, the asset's continuation value goes to debt investors in case of default respectively continuation value equals liquidation value since there exists no bankruptcy cost. As a consequence, welfare here is highest if θ b is as low as feasible. Function θ b is however bounded from below by the bound to the lower dominance region θ. Intuitively, the result holds for two reasons. First, as shown in (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) , if the bank is run-prone the miscoordination problem among depositors gives rise to excessive runs due to panics so that assets are liquidated ineciently often. Second however, the xed ownership structure, which is not present in (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) additionally contributed to excessive runs. This is since independently of whether the bank is run-prone or run-proof, depositors do not participate in the upside potential of the asset. If they roll over their deposit, they may only earn coupon k set by the bank instead of H which in 14 By equation (40), we have
combination with riskiness of bank assets additionally increases the range of inecient runs (fundamental runs). That is, not only the bank's capital structure but also the bank's long-term interest rate policy contributes to ineciency. 15 We dene the value of the bank as the combined value of equity, debt and liquidity assistance L. At the limit, the value of liquidity assistance vanishes and bank value equals value of equity and debt as in the case of Modigliani and Miller (1958) . Since the bank is nanced with δ units in short-term debt and 1 − δ units of equity, we have
where E[EU ] is the value of one unit invested in the debt contract, E[E] is the value of one unit invested in equity and L is the value of liquidity assistance which vanishes with noise. The value of debt and equity depend on the critical state at which asset liquidation occurs. By the accounting identity, the bank's value of liabilities has to equal her total value of investment (assets), and we obtain Proposition 3.2. The value of the run-prone bank equals
where θ b = θ b (δ, k) depends on debt ratio and coupon to depositors.
Bank value is the expected total return on bank investment which equals the asset's liquidation value in case of a run and the asset's continuation value given no run occurs. We immediately see, that bank value crucially depends on the size of the critical state by Lemma 3.3 and is therefore inuenced by debt ratio and coupon via a shift in depositors' behavior. In particular, coupon and debt payments in the contract not solely constitute transfers to compensate depositors for risk but alter bank value by modifying stability θ b . These results are already implied by Rochet and Vives (2004) and Morris and Shin (2016 In the case of run-prone banks, denote by X the random variable which describes state contingent total return on bank investment, then
As debt ratio increases, by Lemma 3.2 the probability of runs and thus riskiness of debt goes up. In equilibrium, the critical state is therefore given as
where we take into account the repricing of risk in form of higher coupons k * (δ)
demanded by depositors. The demanded risk-adjustment k * (δ) plays a crucial role in this paper since it directly impacts the cut-o state and thus the bank's risk-class, again by Lemma 3.2.
Denition 3.1 (Risk-preserving adjustment of coupons). We say that coupon adjusts according to the 'risk-preserving rate' if in equilibrium a marginal increase in debt ratio leads to an increase in coupon such that the critical state (bankruptcy state) θ b (δ, k(δ)) and thus total bank risk remains constant.
Assume bank A and bank B invest in the same asset but have dierent capital structures δ A = δ B . Then both banks belong to the same risk class if and only if for all states θ
for a constant ρ ∈ R + . But this in particular requires that in equilibrium both banks have identical critical states
despite their distinct debt ratios. If we assume without loss of generality that ρ = 1, then for identical critical states we have Intuitively, as coupon increases there exists a trade-o from the point of view of equity investors since the contract costs to the bank go up but stability improves.
By concavity, equity value is either monotone increasing, monotone decreasing or hump-shaped in coupon. Further, as coupon approaches its upper bound, the return of the asset, one can show that equity value undercuts return on a direct investment in the asset and equity investors will not participate, see Lemma 7.1. Consequently, if for some xed debt ratio equity value monotonically increases in coupon, equity investors do not participate for any coupon. On the other hand, equity value strictly increases in coupon as coupon approaches its lower bound which together with concavity implies that under voluntary participation, equity value is hump-shaped, for
given debt ratio there exists a unique interior coupon k u (δ) at which equity value is maximized (unconstrained). If depositors' participation constraint is violated at k u , then the constrained optimal k * exceeds k u and is such that depositors' constraint binds since their utility strictly increases in coupon by Lemma 7.2. Otherwise, if depositors' constraint is slack at k u the optimal coupon is the interior maximizer of equity value k * = k u . In a nutshell, the risk-adjustment in coupon for an incremental increase in debt is either determined by depositors' marginal rate of substitution if their constraint binds or by the change of the unconstrained maximizer k u of equity value. We discuss both in the sequel. 
A rise in debt ratio enters utility (17) directly since given bankruptcy, the asset's liquidation value is shared by more depositors, l/δ decreases. Additionally, there is an indirect feedback eect. Depositors' posterior belief that the bank goes bankrupt increases since the critical state θ b below which bankruptcy occurs goes up which makes the decrease in payo given liquidation even worse. It is due to this feedback eect that the problem of maintaining depositors' utility cannot be considered independently of bank stability (risk class). To maintain participation, the bank has to compensate depositors by increasing the coupon k * at a rate such that depositors' utility is kept constant. But as coupon goes up, not only depositors' utility increases but by Proposition 3.2 also the trigger and thus critical state go down back towards but not necessarily to exactly the original level. This is since also coupon alterations have a twofold eect on depositors' utility. As a direct eect, it increases the payo from rolling over given the bank continues investment. Indirectly, the feedback eect comes in again, stability improves because the critical state drops thus the increase in coupon benets depositors even more, see (17). The equilibrium critical state stays constant as debt increases if and only if depositors' marginal rate of substitution of coupon for debt equals the risk-preserving adjustment of coupon for debt. Equivalently, the critical state is invariant in debt if and only if the rate at which bank stability changes in coupon to compensate for the increase in debt is exactly equal to the direct eect a change in debt has on depositors' utility when holding stability xed, as opposed to the direct eect of an increase in coupons, i.e.
if and only if
where the numerator on the right hand side is the direct change of depositors' utility (change in payos) in debt when ignoring the feedback eect by holding stability xed while the denominator is the direct change in utility due to a change in coupon again net of the feedback eect, see (17), and the left hand side is the risk-preserving adjustment of coupon for debt such that the bank's risk class stays constant. These feedback eects in utilities are common in games of endogenous liquidity risk, see (Eisenbach, 2017) , and here in our case lead to the possibility that a bank's risk class may stay constant in debt despite accounting for bankruptcy and asset illiquidity (Baxter, 1967) if the risk-adjustment in coupon demanded by depositors equals the competitive risk adjustment. The next Theorem tells us when the coupon adjustment under a monopolistic market structure equals the risk-preserving adjustment to keep the risk class constant Proposition 3.3 (Run-prone,binding) . If the bank is run-prone and depositors' participation constraint binds in the optimum, the risk-class is invariant to changes in short-term debt ratio if and only if stability is at level
For θ b < θ M the risk-class decreases, and for θ b > θ M the risk-class increases in debt.
Here, l δ is the liquidation value per depositor in case of bankruptcy, while E[θ] is the expected probability that the asset pays o. Intuitively, if θ b is high, depositors value the increase in coupon less than if θ b was low since for the coupon to be actually paid, the state realization needs to exceed θ b . Therefore, for high critical states the coupon demanded for participation is higher than the coupon necessary to maintain stability. For θ b > θ M , depositors marginal rate of substitution exceeds the risk-preserving adjustment. Thus, in equilibrium bank stability improves in debt by Proposition 3.2, total risk θ b decreases and the risk-class of the bank and thus her value go up, more short-term debt is socially benecial. Vice versa for θ b (δ, k * (δ)) < θ M , the bank's risk class drops, total risk increases, and more shortterm debt is socially costly. First observe, that the case at which the bank's risk class is invariant to changes in debt is not stable. State θ M depends on and increases in the bank's debt ratio. If θ b hits θ M , θ b = θ M , a marginal increase in debt ratio leaves θ b constant while θ M increases and we transition to the case θ b < θ M in which bank stability and thus the bank's risk class and value deteriorate in debt. Next, see that the case θ b ≤ θ M is absorbing. For θ b < θ M , θ b becomes increasing in debt, as is θ M . Even if θ b catches up with θ M and the case θ b = θ M reoccurs, by the same reasoning as above, θ b will bounce back below the bound θ M . For θ b > θ M , bank value increases in debt which implies that in equilibrium θ b decreases and moves towards θ M which increases. There are two possible cases, either θ b decreases in debt until it hits θ M or it decreases for all debt ratios and never hits θ M . If it never hits, bank value increases in debt for all debt ratios. If it hits, θ b is pushed below
Altogether, by the absorption property if the bank's risk-class decreases in debt at some point, it also weakly decreases in debt for all higher debt ratios. Vice versa, if the risk class strictly improves in debt it also improves in debt over all lower debt ratios. Most importantly, the case θ b = θ M occurs only countably often, thus the risk-class of the bank strictly alters in short-term debt ratio and thus capital structure for uncountably many debt ratios.
Case 2: Slack participation constraint If for given debt ratio, depositors' participation constraint is slack at the equity value maximizing coupon k u , the equilibrium coupon equals k * = k u and the equilibrium change in coupon due to an increase in debt ratio is not given by depositors' marginal rate of substitution but by the change of the unconstrained maximizer k u . The bank's risk class remains constant if and only if the change in the maximizing coupon is such that the critical state remains constant which is the case if Proposition 3.4 (Run-prone,slack). In the run-prone case, if depositors' participation constraint is slack in the optimum, the risk-class is invariant to changes in short-term debt ratio if and only if stability is at level
For θ b < θ b,N 2 bank value deteriorates and the risk-class decreases, and for θ b > θ b,N 2 the risk-class increases in debt. The barrier θ b,N 2 decreases in debt.
Here,
is the equity to debt ratio, H/k is the ratio of gross return on investment (asset return) to coupon payable to depositors, while
− k can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted return calculation to equity investors since the asset earns return H only with probability θ while coupon k needs to be paid for sure. For θ b < θ b,N 2 bank value deteriorates since the equilibrium adjustment of coupon due to an incremental change in debt is such that the critical state goes up. Intuitively, for low enough critical states, the bank feels safe. For a small increase in debt she adjusts the coupon to depositors not suciently upwards to maintain bank stability at a constant level and stability drops. The opposite is the case for critical states above θ b,N 2 . The bank fears for her stability and adjusts the coupon upwards more than she would need to maintain stability constant, thus stability improves. Further, analogous to the case with a binding participation constraint, since θ b,N 2 decreases in debt, the critical state can hit θ b,N 2 only countably many times. This is since for θ b = θ b,N 2 , the critical state remains constant while θ b,N 2 decreases in debt. Thus, the case θ b > θ b,N 2 reoccurs and bank stability improves in debt.
Independently of whether the participation constraint binds, for every equilib- The cross derivative of equity value in coupon and debt is in general non-monotone. One can however show that for suciently high debt ratios, the cross derivative is negative if equity value decreases in coupon. Consequently, for high debt ratios, if depositors' participation constraint binds in the optimum (δ, k D (δ)) it also binds for all higher debt ratios, i.e. the participation constraint cannot become slack since the unconstrained maximizer k u decreases. 18 That is, we x an image θ b (δ, k * (δ)) where k * (δ) is the constrained optimum of equity value and consider the set of all debt ratios δ which are mapped at this particular image. Then, all these debt ratios belong to one particular risk class.
Theorem can generically not apply. The result holds since by Proposition 3.5, we can partition the interval of run-prone debt ratios [l, 1] into countably many subintervals where the bounds of the subintervals are determined by those debt ratios at which the bank's risk class remains constant. For debt ratios within each of the subintervals, the risk class of the bank strictly alters. Thus, the number of elements of each risk class is bounded from above by the number of subintervals.
4
Run-proof Case
As the debt ratio of a run-prone bank approaches liquidation value of the asset from above, the bank becomes run-proof. For a run-proof bank, liquidation value of assets covers all debt claims which potentially arise at the interim period and the occurrence of a run is excluded. Debt is risk-free at time one but remains risky at time two due to riskiness of the asset. Consequently, the coordination problem vanishes for run-proof banks, and depositors face a simple decision problem.
In this section, we analyze how bank value changes in debt where debt ratio alters in a way that the bank remains run-proof Lemma 4.1. In the run-proof case, the equilibrium trigger is given as
and the run-threshold of depositors is independent of debt ratio and decreases in coupon.
For state realizations below θ all depositors withdraw, however the bank stays liquid since she is suciently nanced with equity 1 − δ. Since in the run-proof case the asset's liquidation value exceeds the face value of deposits, at the interim period withdrawals by depositors never enforce full liquidation and the bank needs Proposition 4.1. If the bank is run-proof the bank's value at the limit equals
The third term θ θe δ(1 − θH/l)) dθ is negative and constitutes the loss in value which occurs by Proposition (3.3) since depositors also withdraw for state above the ecient liquidation state according to their dominance region which requires inecient liquidation of fraction δn/l of the asset. Before we further discuss bank value of run-proof banks we derive the value of the all equity nanced bank. As debt ratio goes to zero, the run-proof bank becomes all equity nanced and we have Corollary 4.1. The value of the all equity nanced bank equals
Since the bank acts in the best interest of equity investors, in the all equity nanced case the bank liquidates if and only if liquidation is ecient, that is for states below θ e . We can now dene risk classes of run-proof banks Risk-classes (run-proof) Denote by X the random variable which describes total return on bank investment, this time for a run-proof bank. From (22), the total return on investment of a run-proof bank equals
where coupon k is such that depositors participate at debt ratio δ. For run-proof banks, a rise in debt ratio no longer aects the critical state θ b = θ as long as debt ratio is such that the bank remains run-proof. Also, the ecient liquidation state at which the bank liquidates voluntarily is independent of debt. Therefore, to runproof banks the cut-o states of the bank's risk class are independent of debt ratio.
Between the cut-os however, the bank has to liquidate assets to serve withdrawing investors and liquidation is inecient. Since the extent of asset liquidation depends on her debt ratio, lost value increases in debt. Thus, the bank's risk class strictly alters in debt ratio if we can show that depositors do not demand a risk-adjustment of coupon for higher debt ratio. But this is the case since depositors' roll over threshold and their utility is independent of debt in the run-proof case. To see this, consider the limit utility to depositors from the contract
As the bank is run-proof, utility no longer directly depends on debt given a run since the bank can always pay the original coupon of one unit. Additionally, the feedback eect via the trigger does not occur for run-proof banks since the trigger (risk of debt) is independent of debt. Thus, since the risk and utility remain constant in debt depositors do not demand higher coupons as compensation for higher debt ratios. Since the return on investment between the cut-os strictly decreases in debt ratio, the return distribution (risk class) of the run-proof bank alters in debt and
Modigliani Miller cannot apply.
Proposition 4.2. For run-proof banks, the risk-class and value of the bank strictly decrease in debt ratio.
In particular, every risk class has exactly one element and we obtain as counter- The Theorem never holds in general, since total return of run-proof banks strictly alters in debt.
Extension: Deposit Insurance
Under complete deposit insurance, depositors have no incentive to withdraw or are indierent and ignore their signals since they are compensated by the insurer in case the bank cannot repay deposits. A run-prone bank, by the same reasoning as above, never voluntarily liquidates assets early since equity value from continuation is higher than value from liquidation which is at zero. Since assets are never liquidated, value of the run-prone bank equals
The value is independent of debt and coupon payments since no liquidation takes place, and all coupon payments are transfers. Thus, all run-prone, fully insured banks belong to the same risk-class, have same value and the Modigliani Miller Theorem applies.
Proposition 5.1. Under full deposit insurance, all run-prone banks belong to the same risk class.
If the bank faces no liquidity mismatch and is run-proof but completely insured, again all depositors roll over. The bank prematurely liquidates assets voluntarily only if time two equity value from liquidation exceeds equity value from continuation.
That is for states θ < θ v (δ) where
The value of the insured run-proof bank is thus
The voluntary liquidation state θ v depends on the bank's debt ratio. Intuitively, as the bank's debt ratio increases the bank liquidates less often since proceeds from liquidation net of debt service need to exceed equity value from continuation where continuation yields a chance to earn high asset return. Therefore, while all runprone, fully insured banks lie in the same risk class, risk classes of run-proof, insured banks alter in capital structure, i.e. decrease in debt and the Modigliani Miller cannot apply.
Proposition 5.2. Under full deposit insurance, the risk class of run-proof banks strictly decreases in debt ratio .
As in the uninsured case, risk classes of run-proof banks have only one element and Modigliani Miller cannot apply. Further, the run-proof bank liquidates assets too seldom, θ v (δ) < θ e , and by this loses value. Still, θ v > 0 implies that the value of the run-proof fully insured bank exceeds value of the run-prone insured bank which never liquidates, and we have shown Theorem 5.1. Under full deposit insurance, the value of every run-proof bank exceeds value of every run-prone bank. The all equity nanced bank achieves highest value
By convergence of the state θ v , the value of the run-proof insured bank approaches the value of the all equity nanced bank as debt ratio goes to zero and approaches the value of the run-prone insured bank as debt ratio becomes large. Similar to the case without deposit insurance, the Modigliani Miller Theorem cannot apply in general but under insurance applies within the class of run-prone banks. show that a bank's risk class varies in both the amount of short-term debt nancing and coupon demanded for changed risk. Thus, it can be that risk classes contain only small numbers of banks with distinct capital structures although all banks considered invest in the same asset. Therefore, the Modigliani Miller Theorem is in general not applicable since its main requirement, the independence of risk classes from capital structure, is not satised for banks. Banks can become more or less valuable as short-term debt ratio alters and their costs of capital change. In particular, more short-term debt can be socially costly or benecial. While the failure of Modigliani Miller is known for settings which incorporate bankruptcy costs, this paper oers a new perspective from the view point of the game theoretic literature on endogenous liquidity risk.
Our paper deviates from the classic Modigliani Miller setting in various ways
to discuss the connection to the literature on endogenous liquidity risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Morris and Shin, 2016; Eisenbach, 2017) . Crucial for the result to obtain is that the asset carries a liquidity premium such that the bank cannot liquidate prematurely at fair value (continuation value).
As a consequence, the total return distribution jumps in the bankruptcy state which depends on debt ratio and coupon. In contrast, Modigliani and Miller assume perfectly safe debt (no bankruptcy) while Stiglitz (1969) allows for bankruptcy but at no costs. Further, we assume non-contractible actions of the bank manager who acts on behalf of equity investors, similar to Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) . As a consequence, depositors have to run to enforce liquidation which may result in a deadweight loss. The analysis here reduces bank capital structure to short-term debt and equity. The results remain to hold with some minor changes when substituting part of equity with long-term debt. 19 We assume that a lender of last resort exists to intervene with liquidity assistance at the interim period if the bank is solvent but illiquid. We assume this intervention to maintain clean intuition and formula. Assume, all investors follow a symmetric threshold strategy around trigger signal θ * , then the proportion of investors who withdraw at each state is deterministic.
Denote by n(θ, θ * ) the proportion of investors who observe signals below signal θ * and thus withdraw if the true state is θ. Let D(θ i , n(·, θ * )) the expected payo dierence from rolling over versus withdrawing when the investor observes signal θ i , and other investors follow a trigger strategy around θ * . Given signal θ i an investor's posterior belief on state θ is uni-
where 1 trigger equilibrium we need to show that given a signal realization below (above) the threshold which other investors use, the single investor nds it optimal to withdraw (roll over)
and existence and uniqueness of a signal θ * for which an investor is indierent between rolling over and withdrawing (payo indierence)
To prove existence and uniqueness of θ * such that (33) holds, observe that the function D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) is continuous in θ * . By existence of dominance regions, we have D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) < 0 for signals θ * < θ − ε and D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) > 0 for θ * > θ + ε.
Thus, together with continuity by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists at least one θ * for which (33) holds.
To see uniqueness, since all other investors use a threshold strategy around θ * and are small, we know the function n(θ, θ * ) and can substitute n(θ, θ
to derive
where θ(n, θ
is the inverse of the function n(θ, θ * ). For uniqueness, observe that D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) depends on signal θ * only via the asset return function p(θ) which is strictly increasing in signal θ * for θ * < θ + ε.
Thus D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) strictly increases in θ * for θ * ∈ [θ − ε, θ + ε] which together with continuity gives us single-crossing.
Next we need to show that withdrawing is a best response if the private signal of an investor realizes below the trigger played by other investors θ i < θ * , that is we need to show (31). Following Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , let θ i < θ * .
Decompose the intervals [θ i − ε, θ i + ε] and [θ * − ε, θ * + ε] over which the integrals D(θ i , n(·, θ * )) and D(θ * , n(·, θ * )) are calculated into a potentially empty common
Considering (36), the integral θ∈c v(θ, n(θ, θ * )) dθ has to be negative since by Then, by the error distribution
The expected payo from rolling over versus withdrawing given signal θ i = θ * and threshold θ * equals
The marginal investor who observes signal θ i = θ * has a uniform belief on n ∼ U [0, 1] (Laplacian belief, see Morris and Shin (2001) ). Substituting for n using (37),
where
is the inverse of n(θ, θ
Plugging in θ(n, θ * ), since the posterior belief of no run n * equals liquidity ratio l δ we obtain the equilibrium trigger
with derivatives which at the limit equal
Proof. [Lemma 3.3 ] From (41), at the limit ε → 0
Proof. [Proposition 3.2] The utility to depositors from the contract equals
The value of debt equals
Equity value per unit invested (return on equity) equals
Here, −δn(θ) is the repayment to the LOLR who intervenes for states above θ b and −(1 − n(θ))δk is the repayment of debt claims in period two. LOLR intervenes for states above θ b when the bank is solvent while for states above θ * + ε all depositors roll over and intervention is not required. Value of liquidity assistance paid equals
by Lebesgues Dominated Convergence Theorem, as the integrand is bounded.
Away from the limit, value of the bank is the sum of the value of debt, equity and liquidity assistance and the equation follows when canceling out all transfers.
Proof. [Lemma 3.5 ] From (48)
with n(θ b ) = and substituting for n(θ, θ * ),
at the limit, the latter part of the integrand vanishes and we have
since at the limit,
. The rst term is the change in equity value due to a change in stability and is positive, the second term is the change in equity value due to an increase in contract costs and is negative. For the second derivatives, note that we can take partial derivatives of (52) directly since away from the limit in (51), any partial derivative of the second part of the integral would vanish as noise goes to zero.
with n(θ b ) = l δ and again with (51) we can simplify
< 0, all terms are negative and equity value is concave in coupon. As a consequence, for given debt ratio equity value is either monotone increasing, or monotone decreasing or hump-shaped in k. We have Lemma 7.1. As coupon approaches its upper bound, equity investors do not participate.
By Lemma 7.1, for every debt ratio and k → H, equity value undercuts value of a direct investment in the asset, thus in equilibrium for given debt ratio equity values cannot be monotone increasing in coupon since a direct investment in the asset would perform better for all coupons. Consequently, for every debt ratio in equilibrium equity value is either hump-shaped or monotone decreasing in k. We next exclude the latter case. By concavity, if for given debt ratio and equity value decreases in k as k → 1, it also decreases in k for all higher coupons. But
= θ b as k → 1 and at the limit, n = 0 for θ > θ b , thus
Thus,
and lim k→1 ∂ ∂k EV < 0 is equivalent to
but δ 2H−δ < 1 and as k → 1, we have θ b → 1 − ln(l/δ) > 1, thus (59) can never hold and lim k→1 ∂ ∂k EV > 0, thus equity value cannot be monotonically decreasing. Thus, in equilibrium equity value is hump-shaped in coupon k, i.e. there exists an interior maximizer k u of equity value.
Proof. [Lemma 7 .1] From (48),
Since at the limit n = 0 for θ > θ b ,
where the right hand side equals utility from a direct investment in the asset.
Proof. [Proposition 3.3] Dene coupon k D (δ) as the function of debt ratio such that depositors' participation constraint remains binding when altering δ. That is, when considering all run-prone debt ratios δ ∈ [l, 1], the coupon k D may deviate from the constraint optimal k * since in the optimum depositors' constraint may be slack.
Assume for this proof, depositors' participation constraint binds in the optimum, thus we have k * = k D and θ b = θ b (δ, k D (δ)). The change of bank value for a change in debt ratio by Proposition 3.2 equals
where the total change in critical state θ b (δ, k D (δ)) is given as
where ∂k D ∂δ is depositors' marginal rate of substitution. The risk-preserving adjustment k θ b (δ), i.e. the coupon at debt ratio δ such that stability is maintained constant at level θ b satises
Since l − Hθ b < 0, the value of the bank stays constant if and only if the total change in the critical state is zero Proof. [Proposition 3.4 ] The change of bank value for a change in debt ratio is given by (61) where now the total change in critical state θ b (δ, k u (δ)) derives from a direct change in debt and the indirect change via interior, unconstrained maximizer of equity value k u given depositors' constraint is slack
Since k u is implicitly dened by 
where the right hand side is the change in coupon necessary for an incremental change in debt to maintain the bankruptcy state at a constant level. By denition (75), as debt increases, k u has to change in a way that marginal equity value remains zero, i.e. such that the total derivative satises = θ by Lemma 3.3, since H > l. Thus for states θ ≥ θ the bank does not liquidate voluntarily. Now assume θ < θ. Then all depositors withdraw, n = 1 in t 1 and no liquidity assistance is paid. The total continuation value of investment is θH(1 − δ/l) since the bank needs to liquidate fraction δ/l of the asset to repay withdrawing depositors. If she liquidates the entire asset, she realizes l − δ. Thus, she voluntarily liquidates assets if and only if 
LOLR intervenes for states above θ while assistance is needed only for states below θ + ε, otherwise all depositors roll over. Thus, the value of liquidity assistance is
The value of the bank is the sum of equity value, value of debt and liquidity assistance, canceling out all transfers and considering n = 0 for θ < θ − ε V rp = l θ e + 1 θe θ H dθ + δ θ θe n(θ, θ * )(1 − θH/l)) dθ
The states θ e and θ are constant in debt ratio. Only the last term is negative due to inecient liquidation and depends on debt via the integrand and the trigger in the function n(θ, θ * ). The trigger increases in debt and function n increases in the trigger such that the last term and thus value of the run-proof bank monotonically decrease in debt ratio. At the limit, all depositors withdraw n(θ) = 1 for states in the lower dominance region θ < θ and the formula follows.
Lemma 7.4. Consider a run-proof bank. If LOLR intervenes with liquidity assistance for all states, still the bank's risk class varies in debt ratio.
Proof. [Lemma 7.4] This policy can be justied, since a run-proof bank is in fact solvent for all states at the interim period. Then, value of the run-proof bank will take a dierent form. Still, an ineciency whose size depends on the debt ratio will persist since the bank will not liquidate voluntarily at the ecient state. Thus again, her risk-class will vary in her debt ratio. Assume θ < θ. Then all depositors withdraw in t 1 . Equity value from voluntary liquidation is l − δ and equity value from continuation is θ(H − δ) since the LOLR intervenes. Thus, the bank liquidates voluntarily for states
and the cuto below she liquidates voluntarily depends on her debt ratio. Thus, an ineciency remains and again her risk-class depends on her debt ratio.
